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REFUSAL OF BLOOD
TRANSFUSIONS BY
JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES'
JOHN C. FORD, S.J.

EHOVAH'S WITNESSES generally refuse to take blood transfusions even

when these are judged by physicians to be absolutely necessary for
the preservation of life and health. They believe that taking such transfusions is "eating blood," contrary to the prohibition of Leviticus, 3:17, and
Acts, 15:29. Furthermore, Witnesses who are parents of young children
often refuse to allow the children to be given blood transfusions under
any circumstances. And Witnesses sometimes stipulate, before undergoing an operation or delivery, that they will not consent to a blood transfusion for any reason whatever.
This attitude raises various questions: first, as to the Scriptural basis
of their beliefs; second, as to the moral obligations of the parties concerned; third, as to the legal liability of physicians and hospitals; and
fourth, as to the public policy which should be formulated for handling
this type of problem.
I. Scriptural Basis
Jehovah's Witnesses base their practice on a Biblical prohibition against
eating blood. Leviticus, 3:17 reads: "By a perpetual law for your generation, and all your habitations, neither blood nor fat shall you eat at all."
(Cf. also Leviticus, 7:26-27; 17:10-14; 19:26.) It is the position of the
Witnesses that a blood transfusion violates this law of Jehovah."
If it is objected that this was a dietary law, having nothing to do with
the medical use of blood, they reply that a transfusion is the equivalent
of eating; it is intravenous feeding. If it is objected that the Biblical prohibition had to do with animal blood, they reply that since the prohibition
is based on the sacred, life-giving character of the blood, it applies
a fortiori to human blood. If it is objected that the law also forbade fat,
t Reprinted with the author's permission from 22 LINACRE QUARTERLY.
LThe Watchtower, 72 (July 1, 1951) n.13 pp. 414-416, published at Jehovah's Witnesses' headquarters in Brooklyn, gives a rather complete exposition of the Witnesses'
teaching about blood transfusions.
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they say that that part of the law ceased with
the New Testament, while the law against
blood did not.
For they do not admit that the Biblical
prohibition of blood was merely a Mosaic
law. They say that this particular law antedated Moses by centuries, citing Genesis,
9:4; and that it was enforced anew in New
Testament times, citing Acts, 15:29. This is
the famous passage which records the decision of the Council of Jerusalem, given for
certain new Christian converts among the
Gentiles: "That you abstain from things
sacrificed to idols, and from blood, and from
things strangled, and from fornication ....
Whatever may have been the meaning of
the decree of the Council of Jerusalem, and
whatever its force (there are uncertainties
on both points), it is clear from the whole
history of Christendom that the eating of
blood is no longer forbidden. From very
early times the whole Church has proceeded
on the assumption that this law was abrogated with the coming of the Gospel. It is
futile to cite a New Testament passage of
uncertain meaning in the face of this universal tradition.
Exegetes take two general courses in explaining the passage from Acts, 15:29. Most
of them admit that the decree was concerned with dietary law, but hold that it
was a temporary, local ordinance.2 They
point out that it was addressed to the brethren of Gentile origin in Antioch, Syria and
Cilicia (Acts, 15:23), and that its motivation was to avoid shocking the Jewish converts who had been brought up for generations in the Mosaic tradition (Acts, 15:1921). This view is confirmed by the practice
of St. Paul who, though present at the
Cf. E.B. Allo, O.P., Premiere Ppitre aux Corinthiens, (Paris, 1934) p. 247.
2

Council, and one of the messengers sent to
announce the decision, did not enforce it
himself a few years later in another part of
the world. Writing to the Corinthians a few
years after the Council of Jerusalem, he gives
a decision permitting one of the things the
decree had forbidden, namely, the eating of
meat offered to idols (1 Corinthians, 10:
25-30). If one of these dietary prohibitions
was not of universal obligation, then it is improper to urge that the others were.
Another explanation, followed by a few,
is based on a good, early manuscript which
omits the prohibition against "things
strangled." If this is omitted, then the other
three prohibitions bear a meaning which is
not dietary at all. They would refer to the
three great sins of idolatry, murder and impurity. The prohibition of blood would
merely be a prohibition of murder. These
interpreters believe that moral precepts harmonize better with all the circumstances
than mere dietary laws.2
Whatever the meaning and force of the
decree, the thing that is clear from tradition
and from the teaching of the Church is that
there is no longer any law of God that forbids "eating blood." The Scriptural interpretations of the Jehovah's Witnesses suffer
not only from a lack of general principles of
scholarly exegesis, but also from the fundamental defect of looking to the Bible as if
it were a guide in a vacuum, independent of
the teaching of the Church, and independent
of the whole history of Christian tradition.
Christendom did not have to await the coming of the Witnesses to learn that "eating
blood" has been forbidden to Christians all
along. And if it had been, it would still be
Cf. Expository Times, 41 (Dec., 1929) pp. 128129; and Westminster Version, 11, p. 221 n. The
shorter text is favored by Allo with Harnack. Cf.
Allo, op. cit., p. 196.
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a long jump to conclude that to take a blood
''4
transfusion is to "eat blood.
II. Moral Questions
Is a blood transfusion an ordinary means
of preserving life and health?
The terms ordinary and extraordinarydo
not always mean the same thing to doctors
and theologians. Sometimes a procedure
which any physician would call ordinary
would be considered extraordinary in the
theological sense., There is no doubt that a
blood transfusion is an ordinary means of
preserving life and health as far as the physician is concerned. And it would seem,
nowadays, that in most circumstances a
blood transfusion would be considered an
ordinary means in the theological sense. At
least in cities, where hospital care and transfusions are easily available and not unduly
expensive, I believe most theologians would
call it an ordinary means of preserving life
and health. The moral consequence is that
given these circumstances a patient would
be obliged to take this means when it is
judged necessary to preserve life.
But is a blood transfusion an ordinary
means for a person who is firmly convinced

4 Witnesses would presumably object to blood

plasma just as they do to whole blood. I do not
know if they would object to a synthetic plasma
substitute like "Gentran." Many serums and antitoxins are made from blood. Logically, it would
seem they should refuse all of these, also.
5Cf. J.C. Ford, S.J., and J.E. Drew, M.D., "Advising Radical Surgery: A Problem in Medical
Morality," Journal of the American Medical Association, 151 (Feb. 28, 1953) pp. 711-716. For a

general discussion of ordinary and extraordinary
means see G. Kelly, S.J., "The Duty of Using
Artificial Means to Preserve Life," Theological
Studies, 11 (June 1950) n.2, pp. 203-220; and
"The Duty to Preserve Life," ibid., 12 (Dec. 1951)
n.4, pp. 550-556.
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on religious grounds that such a transfusion
is an offense against the law of God? This
raises the question as to how far one may
take into account subjective feelings, subjective errors, mistaken attitudes, etc., in
estimating what is ordinary and what is extraordinary, and in deciding the consequent
objective obligation to take given affirmative measures to preserve life, or in deciding
the objective liceity of foregoing such measures.
At first sight it may seem strange that
subjective errors and attitudes can be the
determinants of objective morality. A little
reflection, however, will show that it has
been customary with moralists to allow subjective elements to be taken into account in
making the moral judgment as to what is
ordinary or extraordinary in a given case. In
the last analysis this may rest on the concept
of stewardship. It is because we are stewards, acting in the name of God, that we are
obliged to take ordinary care of our health.
There is nothing contradictory in supposing
that God does not demand of a steward
efforts which for him are extraordinary,
even if it is an erroneous idea of the steward
that makes them so.
For instance, all are agreed that the individual circumstances must be taken into
account, and one of the circumstances is the
amount of pain involved in a given procedure. But pain is a highly subjective phenomenon. Some people can stand a good
deal. Others cannot. They have an exaggerated horror or an exaggerated reaction
even to a small amount of pain. This is one
subjective, variable element which all moralists, I believe, would recognize as having
to be taken into account to decide the objective obligation 6
6 Noldin, De Praeceptis,n.325, 3, a.
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Some moralists also give the example of
a groundless or exaggerated fear of surgical
operations of any kind. They admit that in
such cases an ordinary surgical procedure
can be considered extraordinary for the in7
dividual in question.
Authors also recognize that a woman who
has an extreme (and therefore irrational)
horror of being examined by a physician
cannot be accused of sin if she refuses to
take this otherwise ordinary means to
preserve life and health. For her it is extraordinary, because of her subjective misconception as to what the virtue of chastity
demands, or her subjective emotional horror which is in fact altogether unreasonable."
Finally there is the well-known, if somewhat fanciful, example of the dying Carthusian who will eat no meat even if the doctors
consider it necessary to preserve his life and
health. The Carthusian does this, in the supposition, out of love of his Rule. But he has
a mistaken idea as to what the Rule requires.
Yet authors admit that his mistaken or exaggerated ideas of devotion to the Rule
make the use of this ordinary means extraordinary for himY
From all this, I would conclude that subjective elements and mistaken subjective attitudes may sometimes be taken into account
when deciding the objective obligation to
make use of a given procedure.
With a sincere Jehovah's Witness who is
firmly convinced that a transfusion offends
God, we are dealing with a case where his
conscience absolutely forbids him to allow
the procedure. In this mistaken frame of

7 Genicot, Theologia Moralis, I, n.364; Noldin,
op. cit., n.325, 3, b, citing Capellmann-Bergmann.
8 St. Alphonsus, Theologia Moralis, lib. III, n.372,
cited by many others.
9 Vermeersch, Theologia Moralis, II, n.300, 5.

mind he would actually commit sin if he
went against his conscience and took the
transfusion. I see no inconsistency in admitting that this frame of mind is a circumstance which makes the transfusion for him
an extraordinarymeans of preserving life.
And it does not seem contradictory to me to
admit that while his reason for refusing is
objectively mistaken and groundless, nevertheless his frame of mind can become at the
same time an objective excuse from the
moral obligation which would otherwise be
present. The obligation to take positive
measures to preserve life is an affirmative
one, and it is not unreasonable to suppose
that God, who is the master of life and
death, does not objectively require of his
steward a means of self-preservation which
appears to the steward to be certainly sinful.
In coming to this tentative conclusion, I am
influenced also by the thought that we can
allow an individual considerable leeway in
exposing his own life to danger, especially
in the negative way of not taking surgical
means to preserve it, and also by the thought
that it is always easier to consider a procedure objectively extraordinary when it is
artificial, comparatively recent, and technically rather complicated.
The consequence of this opinion for the
physician is obvious. Where the patient is
not morally obliged, objectively, to make
use of a procedure, and actually refuses it,
the physician is not morally obliged to give
it to him; nor do the hospital administrators
have a moral obligation to see that he gets it.
In fact, even if one holds that the Witness
has an objective obligation to take the transfusion, it will not in practice make much
difference in estimating the personal moral
obligation of the physician or hospital administrator. If a person had the erroneous
religious belief that he should commit sui-
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cide by taking positive means to kill himself,
we would all agree that it would be justifiable and usually obligatory to prevent him
by force from doing so. But when the erroneous belief has to do with the omission of
a positive, artificial means of self-preservation, it is an entirely different matter to
assert that the physician has any right, and
much less any duty, to force a patient to
conform to the objective moral law. Naturally, all concerned (no matter what
theory they hold as to the objective or subjective morality of the case) will try to persuade the patient to be sensible. But failing
to do so, I do not see that there is any further moral obligation, in either theory, to
take action. The question of legal liability
will be discussed below.
Another consequence of the view that the
sincere Witness is not objectively obliged
to have a transfusion is this: From the moral
point of view, as far as his individual relationship with the patient is concerned, the
physician would be more readily justified in
making an agreement not to give him a
transfusion. But it is a different matter to
decide whether a physician would be morally justified in making such an agreement
in view of the legal consequences which the
observance of the agreement might entail for
himself and for the hospital where he practices. It seems to me that it is both unwise
and unjustifiable for a physician or a hospital to make an agreement involving serious
risks of this kind. A word will be said about
legal liability below.
When a physician makes an agreement
not to give a transfusion he is obliged per se
to honor it. Sometimes, however, contractual agreements cease to bind when unforeseen events make a substantial change in the
subject matter or the circumstances of the
agreement. For instance, a physician might

10
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agree to give no transfusion, and later discover, with the patient at death's door, e.g.,
from hemorrhage during Cesarean section,
that observance of it would entail serious
legal consequences for himself and for the
hospital where he is working. Such unforeseen circumstances would, in my opinion, be
sufficient grounds for releasing him from his
moral obligation to go through with the
agreement. Furthermore, if the law were to
void an agreement of this kind as being contrary to public policy, this might well constitute grounds for a release from one's
personal obligation to observe it, even if it
were not clear whether the law invalidated
the contract itself for the forum of conscience from the beginning.
The foregoing opinions have to do with
the case of an adult Witness. The practical
problems are more difficult and delicate
when the patient is a child or a baby, and
the parents' religious convictions lead them
to refuse to allow a necessary transfusion to
be given. Acute cases have arisen involving
children and infants who are in desperate
need of transfusion) 0 The rights and duties
of all concerned are very different in these
cases from the case of the adult Witness.
It is clear that a child has an objective
right to ordinary care, no matter what its
parents' mistaken beliefs may be. Consequently, when a blood transfusion is a necessary part of this ordinary care, the
parents have an objective moral obligation
to supply it, and if they fail to do so others
who have undertaken the care of the child,
such as physicians and hospital authorities,
have per se a moral obligation to see that
the child gets it. In the case of a young child,
10 Cf. C.C. Cawley, "Parens Patriae: The Sovereign Power of Guardianship," New England Journal of Medicine, 251 (Nov. 25, 1954) n.22, pp.
894-897.
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therefore, it would be morally wrong to
make an agreement not to administer a
transfusion in case of serious need; and if
such an agreement were made, one would
have no obligation to honor it.
The obligation of physicians and others
who have actually undertaken to care for
the child would ordinarily be an obligation
of justice as well as of charity. Others who
have not actually undertaken the care of
the child might have an obligation of charity
to intervene in order to see to it that a
neglected child is properly cared for.
When serious bodily harm to the child, or
even its life is at stake, no one will concede
that the parents' erroneous religious beliefs
must be respected; they have no right to
inflict them on their children.
When there is question of taking means
to preserve life, we can allow a person a
degree of control where his own life is concerned, but can without inconsistency refuse
him such power where another's life is at
stake. For instance, a theologian who would
permit a Carthusian to refuse meat and
continue his abstinence even though it
endangered his life, would never conceivably permit a Carthusian superior, out of
love of the Rule and in order to strengthen
religious discipline, to impose abstinence on
such a subject, or refuse to give him meat
when the doctor ordered it. A parent,
whose false ideas of chastity or horror of
physical examination might be considered a
valid reason or sufficient excuse for refusing
medical care herself, would never be allowed
by any moralist to inflict these ideas on her
young child. If she refused to allow the
doctor to make a necessary examination of
her child for such a reason she would simply
be accused of sinful neglect by the moralists.
Likewise, a religious superior, extraordinarily sensitive to pain, though he might

himself be excused from undergoing a painful operation of an ordinary kind, could not
possibly be permitted to inflict his ideas on
a religious subject. Furthermore, one might
legitimately risk one's own life and be a
martyr of bravery, but one could not oblige
another to do the same in the same circumstances. And so it is possible, without inconsistency, to admit that a blood transfusion
may be an extraordinary means for one who
is erroneously convinced in his personal conscience that such a transfusion offends God;
but to deny that anyone, even a parent, has
a right to inflict such erroneous ideas on a
child.
There are limits to the power of disposal
which parents have over the bodies of their
children. They cannot do them bodily injury
and they cannot refuse them ordinary medical care. The Catholic position, based on
natural law, would be in accord with those
legal decisions which oblige parents to conform to an objective standard of ordinary
care.
It is difficult to define with any accuracy
what is meant by a young child. Certainly
one who has reached his legal majority is
able to speak for himself if he is normally
sui compos. Certainly one who has not
reached the age of reason cannot speak for
himself. But what about those who are, for
example, between the ages of seven and
twenty-one? Hardly anyone would say that
a nine-year-old child could decide for himself to refuse the transfusion even at the risk
of life. But there might be many a nineteenyear-old that could. No one can draw the
age line exactly, and it would always be
subject to individual differences, because
some children attain maturity earlier than
others. But the younger the child, the more
one would hesitate to allow it to make such
a decision. And of course, the physician

10
should take special legal precautions to
protect himself in the case of any minor.
It was stated above that physicians and
others who have undertaken the care of a
child have per se a moral obligation to
administer a transfusion when this is an
ordinary and necessary means of preserving
life; and that the mistaken religious beliefs
of the parents do not of themselves excuse
from this obligation. The phrase per se was
used because in practice the physician may
not be able, morally speaking, to do what
he believes is necessary. If he insists on a
transfusion, the parents will probably take
him off the case. Or if they persist in their
refusal, he could be morally justified in withdrawing from the case. After all, his legal
position is far from clear; and it is no small
matter to undertake a surgical procedure on
a young child contrary to the express refusal
of the parents to allow it. Serious surgical
accidents happen even with a relatively safe
procedure like a blood transfusion. Where
would the physician stand if such an accident happened when he was operating
contrary to the parents' will? The moral
consequence of these considerations is that
although there is per se an obligation to
administer such a transfusion, there may
often be an excuse from it in practice-at
least in those cases where physicians and
hospital administrators are not protected
by a court order.
III. Legal Liability
When physicians or hospital authorities
have undertaken the care of a Jehovah's
Witness, or the child of a Witness, embarrassing legal dilemmas may arise. Particularly trying are those cases in which the
Witness refuses for self or child a transfusion which is judged to be imperatively
needed to prevent imminent death.
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A series of hypotheses can be imagined.
One can inquire about criminal or civil liability or both; about the case of the adult or
the case of the child; about the case where
the transfusion is given or where it is omitted; about the case where there has been an
explicit agreement not to give a transfusion,
or the case where no such agreement exists;
about the case where the patient survives
and resents the transfusion, or the case
where he dies because the transfusion was
omitted, or even where he dies as a result of
a surgical accident connected with the transfusion itself. By combining these suppositions in various ways, and including cases
where the surviving relatives take civil
action or attempt criminal complaints, one
can imagine a large number of hypothetical
legal problems. A further twist could be
introduced by supposing that the doctor
himself is a Jehovah's Witness, who by his
advice abets the patient in his refusal of a
transfusion, or, especially, abets the parent
who refuses it for a young child.
It is not my intention or my province to
try to solve all the labyrinthine ins-and-outs
of these problems. The attempt would be
unduly speculative anyway, seeing that
precedents in the form of actually decided
cases are hard to find. I mention the possibilities in order to illustrate the multiplicity
of the legal problems that could conceivably
arise. My present purpose is merely to recall
some generally admitted legal principles
which are apropos, and to make some general suggestions, leaving it to the individual
physician or hospital to get professional
advice when faced with an actual dilemma.
A recent article has reviewed the state of
the law on "Criminal Liability in Faith
Healing."" This interesting essay deals not
11 C.C. Cawley in 39 Minnesota Law Review, 4874 (Dec. 1954).
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only with faith-healing cases strictly socalled, but also with cases involving Christian Scientists and Jehovah's Witnesses.
Although it does not touch on the specific
problems of physicians' liability, some of its
conclusions are instructive for our purposes,
especially where children are made to suffer
for their parents' beliefs.
One of the principles now established is
that a parent who fails to provide necessary
medical care for his child can be held criminally liable. "Since the turn of the century,
then, it has been well established that a
parent commits a misdemeanor when, due
to religious belief, he denies his sick child
the medical aid required by statute, and
that, if the child consequently dies, the
parent is liable for manslaughter." 1 2 Faithhealing defendants appeal in vain to the
religious freedom clauses of the first
amendment. The Supreme Court of the
United States in the famous Mormon polygamy case stated: "Laws are made for the
government of actions, and while they cannot interefere with mere religious belief and
opinions, they may with practices. Suppose
one believed that human sacrifices were a
necessary part of religious worship, would it
be seriously contended that the civil government under which he lived could not
'1 3
interfere to prevent a sacrifice?"
It is anomalous that in the United States
the pastor or religious leader who abets a
parent in the criminal neglect of the child is
apparently not held liable. "It is clear," says
Cawley, "that in Canada, criminal liability
Loc. cit., p. 57, citing three leading cases: For
England, Reg. v. Senior, 1 Q.B. Div. 283, 19 Cox
C.C. 219 (1899). For Canada, Reg. v. Lewis, 6
Ont. L. Rep. 132, 1 B.R.C. 732 (1903). For the
United States, People v. Pierson, 176 N.Y. 201, 68
N.E. 243 (1903).
13 Reynolds v. United States. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
12

attaches to the pastor or other adult who
actively counsels a parent against furnishing his child with necessary medical care....
I submit that here is the glaring anomaly in
our law: that the parent who denies a child
medical aid is punished, while the pastor
4
who counsels that denial goes free."'
It would not be legitimate to infer, however, that a physician would be equally free
from criminal liability. Once he has undertaken the care of the child he has affirmative duties in its regard, and for him to
advise and abet parents in their neglect of
necessary care would put him in a position
very different legally, it seems to me, from
that of the pastor.
It must be confessed, however, that as
far as giving or omitting a blood transfusion
is concerned, the physician seems to be
caught in a conflict of legal obligations. He
is obliged not to undertake a surgical procedure, even if he judges it necessary, without the parent's consent. This rule is so
clearly established that it needs no elaboration. On the other hand, is he not obliged
to give a blood transfusion which is desperately needed, when the parents who refuse
to provide it are guilty of criminal neglect?
But then, in doing so, he is really taking it
upon himself to decide two questions which
in a given case, or in a given jurisdiction,
might be open to dispute: the question of
fact: "Is this transfusion absolutely necessary?," and the question of law: "Is this
transfusion part of the reasonable medical
care which the law requires parents (and
others) to provide?" And finally, as mentioned above, he would be violating the
well-established rule that to operate without
consent is to be guilty of assault and battery.

14

Loc. cit., p. 72 and p. 74.
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In this dilemma it would seem that the
physician's only complete legal security is
in a court order empowering him to go
ahead with the transfusion even against the
parents' wishes. But in the absence of such
an order, in a clear-cut desperate case, I
should imagine that a physician would have
little to fear legally from giving the transfusion. It does not seem likely that he would
be made to suffer legally if he could show
that the life of the child was really at stake,
and that the parents' refusal of a transfusion constituted criminal neglect on their
part. But conceivably it might involve him
in troublesome and expensive litigation.
It is all very well to hold the parents for
manslaughter if the child dies, but is there
not available some legal means of preventing the tragedy? In Chicago, in 1951, in the
case of the child Cheryl Linn Labrenz, the
courts found a method of circumventing the
persistent refusal of the parents. A petition
was filed in Family Court to the effect that
the child was dependent because of lack of
parental care and guardianship. The Chief
Probation Officer was appointed guardian
with the right to consent to necessary blood
transfusions. These were given and the
child's life was saved. Cawley describes the
appeal to the doctrine of parens patriae in
this Illinois case, and in similar cases15 in
15 Loc. cit., p. 57 ff., citing: People ex rel. Wallace

v. Labrenz, 411 Il1. 618, 104 N.E.2d 769 (1952);
Mitchell v. Davis, et al., 205 S.W.2d 812 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1947); Morrison v. State, 252 S.W.2d
97 (Mo. App. 1952); In re Seiferth, 127 N.Y.S.2d
63 (Children's Court, Erie County, 1954). For a
discussion of this last case, and further references
to the decided cases, see "Recent Cases" in 39
Minnesota Law Review, 118-122 (Dec. 1954). See
also "Comment: Custody and Control of Children," 5 Fordham Law Review, 460 (1936). In a
Washington case, where the surgery itself involved
serious danger to the child, the court refused to
intervene: In re Hudson, 13 Wash. 2d 673, 126 P.
2d 765 (1942).
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Texas, Missouri, and New York. Sometimes, however, the legal machinery creaks
and cannot be put into effect with sufficient
16
dispatch to save the child.
If I may be allowed to make some suggestions regarding cases involving children,
I would stress the following points.
It is legally inadvisable to make any
agreement or contract with a parent not to
give a necessary blood transfusion to a
child. As was stated above in Part II, this
would also be open to moral objections.
The only complete legal security for physicians and hospital authorities who would
give a transfusion contrary to the parents'
wishes would be in a court order. Consequently those concerned should familiarize
themselves with the available legal procedures in their own jurisdiction, and get
legal advice ahead of time on the method
of obtaining such an order as quickly as
possible should the need arise.
When the case is desperate, and no order
has been obtained, it would appear that there
is not much to fear by way of legal liability
in giving the transfusion. And considerations of charity for the neglected child may
well weigh the balance in favor of transfusion. But one should get competent legal
advice on each case as it occurs.
The case of the adult Witness who refuses
consent for an imperatively necessary transfusion does not cause such troublesome
complications. The law seems to allow an
adult to run risks with his own life which he
may not take with the life of his minor
child. In a Supreme Court decision we read:
"The right to practice religion freely does
not include liberty to expose the community
or the child to communicable disease or the
latter to ill health or death.... Parents may
16 Cawley, loc. cit., p. 62, gives the details of the

Grzyb case in Chicago, Jan. 1954.

JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES

be free to become martyrs themselves. But
it does not follow they are free, in identical
circumstances, to make martyrs of their
children... .,17And Cawley remarks: "Society and the courts seem to say: 'We are
determined that a child shall grow up safely
and in good health to maturity, and we will
intervene when his life or health is threatened by his parent's religious or other eccentricities. But having taken the trouble so
to see him into manhood, why, if he thereafter chooses foolishly to endanger his own
life-and does not at the same time endanger
others-then we wash our hands of him.' "s
In some jurisdictions attempted suicide is
a crime, and one who aids and abets a
suicide or an attempt at suicide is criminally
liable. But there are no cases, apparently, to
show that an adult who refuses a particular
surgical procedure, considered by physicians to be necessary to prevent death, is
guilty of the crime of attempted suicide.
Indeed, the difference between taking affirmative action on purpose to destroy one's
own life, and merely refusing to make use
of a highly technical surgical means of preserving it, is a very obvious one. And it
would be far-fetched, indeed, to imagine
that a physician who failed to transfuse
could be held criminally liable on any
theory of aiding and abetting attempted
suicide, whether his failure stemmed from
sympathy with the patient's beliefs, or from
the patient's refusal to permit the transfusion.
The patient's consent is required before
a physician may legally perform any surgical operation. "Operation without consent
is a trespass. It constitutes a technical as-

sault and renders the operating surgeon
liable."' 19 And when the adult patient who
is in his right mind resolutely refuses to
consent and positively forbids the operation,
the physician is absolutely obliged, legally,
to respect his wishes. The patient's persistence may result in his death, but I have
not been able to find any authority for the
statement that the physician would incur
either criminal or civil liability by his failure
to force a transfusion or other surgical procedure on an unwilling patient even in these
2
extreme circumstances. 0
If surgeons do not dare to transfuse a
child in the face of the parents' refusal, and
have to resort to the cumbersome device of
a court order for legal protection, even with
the child at the point of death, it seems very
unlikely that they will expose themselves to
legal liability by not transfusing a, recalcitrant adult, who, being of right mind, positively forbids the operation. Giveh a case
of acute appendicitis with extreme danger
of death, and a patient who in his right
mind resolutely. refuses surgery, there is
only one thing for the doctor to do: omit
the surgery and take what measures he can
to save the patient's life. The same thing is
true of adult transfusion cases.
There does not seem to be any legal
machinery by which a court order can be
obtained to empower a physician to operate
on an unwilling adult or by which surgical
treatment can be forced on him. In my
opinion this is as it should be. The bodily
integrity of an individual should enjoy a
19Louis J. Regan, Doctor and Patient and the

167 (1944). Quotation of this passage does not
indicate agreement with the decision in the case.

Law, 2d ed., St. Louis 1949, p. 58.
20 There is a Massachusetts case in which the court
held that where a patient refused to have an x-ray
taken, the physician was not responsible for the
consequences of the patient's own want of care.
Carey v. Mercer, 239 Mass. 599, 132 N.E. 353

18 Loc. cit., p. 69.

(1921).
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Rutledge, J., in Prince v. Mass., 321 U.S. 158,
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very high degree of immunity from invasion
by public authority, as will be asserted
below. This is especially true when conscientious convictions are at stake.
Although the physician incurs no liability
by omitting the transfusion, yet he may not
be in a position to prove that the consent
was actually refused. If the patient dies and
his survivors want to make trouble, they
may be able to do so unless the physician
can produce something in writing to show
that consent was refused. If a physician decides to undertake the care of a patient
who makes a stipulation or is likely to make
a stipulation against blood transfusions, it
would be wise for him to protect himself by
a written witnessed order from the patient
to that effect, together with a written release
from all liability in case the lack of transfusion results in harm or death to the
patient. One should have professional legal
advice in formulating such an agreement
and release.
Should physicians and hospitals, then,
simply refuse to undertake the care of a
patient who rejects or is likely to reject a
blood transfusion on religious grounds? Obstetrical cases offer a special difficulty since
even though one acceded to the request not
to transfuse the mother, it seems legally
inadvisable and morally improper to make
such an agreement regarding her baby. I
doubt if a universal answer can be given to
the question either for the obstetrical or for
other cases. In some cases the future need
of transfusion is so likely that it would be
foolish to undertake the case and at the
same time deprive oneself of an essential
element for successful treatment. I doubt,
however, whether a physician's reputation
(or the hospital's) would suffer to any extent if a patient is lost through his own
refusal of a transfusion. But it is not an easy
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thing to have to stand by with hands tied
while one's own patient makes a martyr of
himself on such flimsy grounds. On the
other hand, where will the thousands of Witnesses get medical care if everyone refuses
to have anything to do with them? It seems
to me that acute dilemmas are going to be
sufficiently unusual and infrequent so that it
would be too drastic to refuse all Witnesses
because of the relatively few desperate
cases likely to eventuate. Witnesses may
often start by refusing. But under the pressure of imminent death many will doubtless
find their native common sense triumphing
over their peculiar religious indoctrination.
IV. Public Policy
It is obvious from the foregoing that
general questions of State power arise whenever there is a conflict or an apparent conflict between what the individual's conscience may demand of him, and what the
public good or the rights of other individuals may require. These are the questions of
"public policy" referred to here. The general question of Church and State and religious freedom is too large for our discussion.
I intend to speak of public policy only in
relation to blood transfusions and closely
related matters.
My reason for discussing this aspect of
the matter at all is that I consider it important to defend and support the view that it
is good public policy to concede to the State
the power to give a necessary blood transfusion to a child against the sincere but
erroneous religious convictions of the parent; and that it is bad public policy to concede to the State the right to force an adult
to take this means of staying alive against
his own sincere religious convictions.
It would be considerably easier to determine these questions of public policy if we
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lived in a society in which the great mass
of the citizens were all in agreement as to
the requirements of the natural moral law
and of the positive laws of God. For in such
a case there would at least be no conflict
between the laws of the State and the objective law of God. But even in such a society
one would still have to contend with the
individual erroneous conscience. One would
still have to uphold the right of the individual to follow such a conscience when he
sincerely believed that not to do so would
be a sin offending God. And in practical
cases one would still have the task of determining when a religious practice based on
an erroneous idea of the will of God was so
harmful to the common good or so contrary
to the rights of other individuals that it
had to be restrained.
In the society we live in there is no such
general agreement as to the requirements
of the objective moral law. Catholics believe
that from reason and revelation they are in
possession of those moral truths by which
we are expected to conform ourselves to the
will of God. And this belief is based partially on the more fundamental one that the
Catholic Church was founded by Christ,
who is the Son of God, and that this Church
has power to teach authoritatively in matters of faith and morals. Obviously these
beliefs are not shared by the majority of
our citizens. It might seem at first sight,
therefore, a rather hopeless task to try to
formulate a statement of public policy
which would be consistent with Catholic
teaching, acceptable to the mass of citizens
and capable of being put into practical
effect.
But the situation is not as bad as it seems.
We have a common heritage of JudeoChristian thought which still pervades many
of our political institutions and much of our

national thinking. There would be quite
general agreement, in the Anglo-Saxon tradition, that the State should be allowed to
interfere with the individual liberty as little
as possible. And very few would object to
the doctrine that the State must be empowered to protect the lives of its citizens, especially young children, against fantastic
religious aberrations. It is not impossible,
when people agree on general principles
such as these, to achieve a considerable
measure of agreement on practical problems
of public concern as to the life and health
of the people. On the great majority of such
problems we can hope to arrive at practical
norms agreeable to the mass of the citizens
and not at variance with the objective moral
law. Exceptions should be of infrequent
occurrence.
It is the task of moralists and lawmakers,
then, to try to draw a practical line which
will delimit the powers of the State and the
rights of the individual-a lineiwhich will
protect against religious fanaticism and at
the same time do justice to natural law
principles and to sincere religious convictions whether erroneous or not.
At the outset, in drawing this line, two
mistakes at opposite extremes are to be
avoided. The first exaggerates State power.
The second exaggerates individual liberty.
State power is exaggerated when one subscribes to the proposition that any interference by the State can be justified as long as
the majority opinion approves. To make
public policy a mere function of the will of
the majority reduces it in the last analysis to
some form of the doctrine that might makes
right. Such thinking was utterly foreign to
the founding fathers of the American republic. But it has found some modern adherents
both on the philosophical and practical
level. They reduce law to the organized
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force of the majority that stands behind it.
They use the words "undemocratic" and
"divisive" to describe those who dissent
from majority views.
Democracy does not mean that the majority is right. Majority rule is a practical
way of making a republic work. If it were
true that mere force of numbers made the
difference between right and wrong, good
and bad, then mere force would be controlling. Might would make right. But if anything is clear in the fundamental political
thought of our country, it is the idea that
minorities have a right to exist and to propagate their ideas. It was a minority that
thought slavery wrong and finally abolished
it. Right and wrong are not determined by
a show of hands. They are determined by a
show of minds.
Now one may take the viewpoint of the
practical statesman, that in our system the
holders of minority views must be protected
(within limits) whether they are right or
wrong, and that it is hard to say which is
which. Or one may take the viewpoint of
the Catholic moralist who claims to know
what is right and demands protection for
the minority view when it is right, and for
the erroneous conscience (again within
limits) when it is wrong. But in both cases
the principle of individual liberty is safeguarded against invasion by mere majority
might. In both cases it is possible to arrive
at practical formulations largely agreeable
to both viewpoints.
The mistake at the opposite extreme is to
imagine that any practice, no matter how
immoral, or ridiculous, or dangerous must
be tolerated in the interests of individual
liberty if it is based on sincere religious
belief. The example of human sacrifices
mentioned above in Reynolds v. United
States speaks for itself.
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One may assert further, with varying degrees of assurance, that the State can and
ought to prevent the Hindu widow from
casting herself on her husband's funeral
pyre; or the Japanese officer from committing hara-kiri; or anyone at all from committing suicide; or the Mormon from practicing polygamy; or the evangelical fanatic
from exposing others to snakebite; or the
Christian Scientist from neglecting ordinary
medical care for a dangerously sick child;
or a Hindu from going about unvaccinated
in an epidemic because he has religious
scruples about using cows to produce vaccine; or a Church congregation from conducting services when a quarantine has been
imposed to safeguard the public health.
But it is to be noted of all these examples
that the justification of State interference
is based on urgent considerations of the
public good, or the imperative need to protect some individual person's right to life
and health. The principle that the State
should interfere as little as possible with
individual liberty, especially where bodily
integrity is involved, and most of all where
conscience is affronted, is acceptable to most
legislators and, I am sure, to all Catholic
philosophers. Only strong, clear reasons of
the common good, or the clear necessity of
protecting the rights of others, especially
defenseless children, can justify State intervention in such cases. Catholics, being
themselves a minority group, are especially
jealous of their rights in this regard and
especially loath to concede to the State a
power of intervention which might be
turned against them.
What then of public policy where the
conscientious refusal of blood transfusions
is concerned? Having put the problem in its
philosophical setting, where should that
practical line be drawn to delimit State
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power and protect individual liberty in this
field? My opinion and the reasons for it can
now be briefly recapitulated.
The State should not be empowered to
force a transfusion on an adult Witness who
is in his right mind and who, because of his
religious convictions, refuses it. First, because this would be an unwarranted invasion
of his rights of conscience. The State cannot show that interference with individual
liberty in such a case is justified. There is
involved here no urgent need of protecting
the common good, no pressing necessity of
protecting the rights of others.
Secondly, for the Witness, given his
frame of mind, the use of a blood transfusion is an extraordinary means of preserving
life to which he is not objectively obliged
by the moral law. This was the tentative
opinion defended in Part II, above. The
State should certainly not be empowered
to force an individual to make use of a
surgical procedure to save his own life,
when the moral law itself does not oblige
him, in the circumstances, to do so. If the
moral law leaves him free to risk his life to
that extent, the State should leave him free
also.
Thirdly, if one takes the other view and
considers that a transfusion is an ordinary
means even for a conscientious objector,
one should still deny the right of the State
to intervene. The State is not competent to
enforce every aspect of the moral law. The
line between ordinary and extraordinary
means of self-preservation is finely drawn
and hard to determine. Can we allow the
State, in the absence of urgent considerations of public good or the rights of others,
to become the moral arbiter, with power
to encroach upon the bodily integrity of the
citizen? Has anyone ever thought that the
State could force a man to undergo surgery

for appendicitis, because he was in danger
of death without it? Furthermore, in the
transfusion case, there is also at stake the
right of conscience.
Someone may object: If the State has the
power to make attempted suicide a crime
and to prevent a person from committing
suicide, then, a pari, it should have the
power of forcing a transfusion on an unwilling, conscientious objector. For to refuse
the transfusion is the equivalent of committing suicide. In our opinion there is no adequate parity between the two cases. The
person who commits suicide violates a negative precept of the law of God: "Thou shalt
not kill." The moral situation of one who
fails to take affirmative measures to keep
himself alive is quite different, especially
when the measures concerned are artificial
surgical procedures. It is not inconceivable
that there should exist a legal tradition of obligatory self-preservation, a tradition which
would impose the affirmative legal duty of
taking certain minimum measures to stay
alive - for instance, to take food and drink.
But I find it hard to conceive a theory of
jurisprudence in which the State would be
empowered to impose on me an affirmative
legal duty to make use of highly developed
surgical techniques in order to prolong my
earthly existence. To kill oneself is one
thing. Not to avail oneself of surgery is
quite another.
Finally, in the case of the child, I believe
the State is justified in intervening and giving a necessary transfusion, even if the
parents object on religious grounds. First,
because the child has a certain objective
right to life and to ordinary medical care to
preserve life, no matter what its parents'
mistaken beliefs may be. Secondly, where
there is a clear-cut case of necessity, to save
an innocent person from impending death,

10
the State can intervene even at the expense
of the erroneous conscience. Thirdly, no
one objects to the power of the State to
supply for the neglect of the parents in
other, lesser matters. If the parents are cruel
or sufficiently negligent of health, education
or morals, the State, for the good of the
child, can remove it from the custody of the
parents for extended or indefinite periods.
A fortiori, it should be empowered to save
the child's life by seeing that it receives a
necessary transfusion.

CHARITABLE BEQUESTS
(Continued)
tionary power to invade the principal of the
trust for a noncharitable beneficiary, unless
the power of invasion is limited by a definite
standard and as of the date of decedent's
death the likelihood of any invasion is so
remote as to be negligible. 28 A deduction
for the charitable remainder is also jeopardized where a trustee is authorized to distribute to a noncharitable life tenant capital
gains dividends received on stock of regu2
lated investment companies.
Conclusion
These observations on some important
federal estate tax considerations in drafting
charitable bequests have been offered only
28 Rev. Rul. 54-285, 1954-2 CuM. BULL. 302. See

also the appendix to the opinion in Kline v.
United States, 202 F. Supp. 849 (N.D.W. Va.
1962), where the cases on invasion of charitable
remainders are collected and analyzed in tabular
form.
29 Rev. Rul. 60-385, 1960-2 CUM. BULL. 77.
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This rather long inquiry into the scriptural, moral, legal and public policy aspects
of the transfusion case is justified, I hope,
by the importance of the problems it raises.
Not the least among them is the very human
one of dealing with the stubborn sincerity
of the Witness. I suggest patience, when
their intransigence becomes irritating, and
still more patience when their mistaken zeal
attacks the Church of Christ. Our hospitals
and physicians can show them by example
that the charity of Christ is all-embracing.

as a brief review for those who are already
familiar with the subject and as an introduction for others. For those interested in reading further, there is a substantial body of
literature available. °
If one were to single out a recommendation for estate planning in this area, it
would be that the lawyer approach the
drafting of all but the most routine bequests
as one challenged to conform the product of
his draftsmanship to the provisions of highly
technical statutory and regulatory provisions. Working with the Code and the estate
tax regulations at one's elbow gives reasonable assurance of solving all but the most
abtruse problems.
80 E.g., Fraser, Charitable Giving as an Element
in Planning Lifetime and Testamentary Giving,
N.Y.U. 19TH INST. ON FED. TAx 751 (1961);
Golden, Use of Charitable Gifts in Estate and
Tax Planning, 100 TRUSTS & ESTATES 898 (1961);
Quiggle & Myers, Tax Aspects of Charitable Contributions and Bequests by Individuals, 28 FORDHAM L. REV. 579 (1960); and Richardson, Gifts
of Property to a Charity, 1957 So. CAL. TAx INST.
705.

